Explanation of Links, part the 22nd, Davids Medienkritik

http://medienkritik.typepad.com/blog/

David is a German with an English-language weblog; he monitors German media with insightful commentary. David is 'da man.'

JG - Radicals and conservatives

http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20050427/cleisure/cleisure2.html

Radicals and conservatives

published: Wednesday April 27, 2005

Peter Espeut

WHEN IT comes to theft or murder, I am a conservative; I am decidedly against them! What would a radical say?

When it comes to poverty I am a radical; I believe that in Jamaica poverty has been carefully preserved at a high level to drive down wages and to keep the masses dependent upon politicians. What would a conservative say?

The trouble is that these words 'radical' and 'conservative' have been co-opted by political types to mean politically 'left' and 'right', two other words which have been co-opted.

ATTACHING LABELS

The word for 'left' in Latin is 'sinister', and the word for "right" is 'dexter' (from which we get the word dexterity). And of course, the word "right" also means "correct".

I have always been amused at the games people play when they glibly attach these labels to people or governments or churches or (more recently) to popes. Being left wing means having socialist or communist leanings (which to many is sort of sinister), whereas being right wing means being right, I suppose.

The English word 'radical' is derived from the Latin word 'radix' which means "root". So a 'radical' is someone who gets down to the root, basis or foundation of the issues. A political radical, therefore, is one who prescribes fundamental change, since their analysis of society turns up so much that is wrong.

A 'conservative' is someone who seeks to retain and preserve the status quo (things as they are).

Being conservative is not a bad thing if what you wish to maintain is good (like laws against robbery and murder). A political conservative wishes to keep things as they are, presumably since they value the present order, or feel that its continuance is in their personal interest.

Whatever labels like 'radical' and 'conservative' may mean politically, they lose their meaning when you apply them to morality and ethics. Is someone conservative because they believe in honesty, and radical if they believe in corruption?

I have been called both names in my short life, and I bear both titles proudly. I am radical because I seek to get to the root of Jamaica's social problems ­ wherever the analysis may lead ­ and I call a spade a spade.

I am proud to be a conservative because I believe in defending the values I hold dear, like justice and fair play. In both cases the issue is truth. I am therefore both a radical and a conservative at the same time, and there is absolutely no contradiction.

THEOLOGICAL CONSERVATIVE

I hear journalists ­ particularly Americans ­ calling Pope Benedict XVI a theological conservative because he defends the Roman Catholic Church's position on homosexuality, abortion and contraception. If they wished, they could label him a theological radical for the same reason.

Respect for life and the family is at the very roots of the Christian faith, and it is his duty to conserve it. To depart from the gospel of life would almost be to depart from Christianity itself. Terms like 'radical' and 'conservative' are profoundly useless in addressing moral issues.

Which is a distinction the U.S. seems to miss even if the new pope is rather clear on the subject.

What is even more interesting is that the American media include the issue of priestly celibacy along with homosexuality, abortion and contraception when calling Pope Benedict XVI a theological conservative.

Interesting is far too gentle a term. Essentially, they are a bundling of issues which distinctly delineate the difference between, for instance, a member of the "Third Estate" and the Roman Catholic Church.

The requirement that its priests and bishops be celibate (unmarried and continent) is neither a moral nor a theological issue, and does not belong in that list.

There is no theological or ethical imperative for Roman Catholic clergy to remain unmarried; and indeed, that was not the case in the early church.

It is also not a requirement, for instance, within the Uniate Church, which is in communion with the Roman Catholic Church, as well as for married former Anglican and Episcopal priests who join the Church.

Celibacy is a discipline which the Church requires priests and bishops voluntarily to impose upon themselves; this requirement could be changed tomorrow, with no moral or theological implications. Not so for homosexuality, abortion and contraception. A change in these positions would result in a different church!

Precisely!

The Anglican Church in parts of the United States is now a different church than it was a few decades ago, such that it has been suspended from the Anglican communion.

It's also driven away about a third of its U.S. members in the last decade, from over three million members to a figure between two and three million members.

To say that homosexuals must not be discriminated against in the workplace, and that Christians must welcome persons of homosexual orientation into the church is one thing (both of which the Roman Catholic Church accepts, as do I). But to ordain as a bishop a practising homosexual who lives with his boyfriend in the presbytery ­ with his boyfriend in the front row of the cathedral ­ is quite another. A line definitely has been crossed.

And to castigate Benedict XVI for not following suit even before he is installed as Pope, calling him conservative, is poor journalism. I don't believe that the U.S. media really understand the issues.

Peter Aspect is a sociologist and a Roman Catholic deacon.

Explanation of Links, part the 21st, Daniel Pipes

http://www.danielpipes.org/

Danial Pipes is an outstanding writer on the Middle East in general and Islam in particular.

JG - Deportee denied wish to visit dying son

http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20050426/news/news2.html


Deportee denied wish to visit dying son

published: Tuesday April 26, 2005

A JAMAICAN father's wish to see his dying son, who is on a respirator in a New York City hospital, is unlikely to come true because of his criminal record.

Which is as it should be. It's difficult enough to get someone deported the first time.

The man, Garland Douglas, was deported from the United States six months ago after serving four years in a New Jersey prison for money laundering.

If he was convicted of money-laundering, one can reasonably posit involvement in the drug trade and many other crimes of which there was insufficient evidence. Remember, Al Capone was only convicted of tax evasion.

His son, Teron Francis, was declared brain dead last Thursday after being admitted to hospital with what seemed to be a bad headache and toothache. Teron, who was born in the U.S., has never visited Jamaica. He was scheduled to come here in July to see his father who, reportedly, lives in Mandeville, Manchester.

Teron Francis' situation is indeed tragic. In cases where the parent wasn't a deported felon and a close family member was hospitalized and/or near death, I've seen a number of emergency tourist visas materialize for applicants who, in the normal run of things, wouldn't receive them. But the adjudicating officer believed that the applicant would return home, that the applicant was a concerned or grieving parent, not an intending immigrant.

I'd note, however, that one of the things the admittedly steep $100 visa application fee pays for is the phones with which consular officers can call hospitals to verify this sort of situation.

VISIT WILL NOT MATERIALISE

That visit will not materialise due to the tragic turn of events. Mr. Douglas was hoping that U.S. immigration authorities would soften their stance which bars deportees from re-entering that country and allow him to travel to New York City to see his son.

While there are such things as waivers for persons ineligible to receive visas, they take time to be approved, as they can't be approved by a consular officer on their own authority, even in those cases where the adjudicating officer might feel it was the right thing to do. It's out of their hands, really. And unlikely to get a positive result in a timely enough fashion to be of any legitimate use to the deportee applicant.

"I told them (U.S. Consulate) of the the situation with my son but they told me once you've been deported it wouldn't make sense to try to get in again," Mr. Douglas told the New York Post newspaper.

Even if that's an accurate recapitulation of what Mr. Douglas was told, it's less a dispositive adjudication than friendly, and accurate, advice. After all, convicted money-launderer was only deported six months ago.

Attempts by The Gleaner to get a response from the U.S. State Department in Washington DC yesterday were unsuccessful.

If this was published on TUESDAY, wasn't the article written on MONDAY, and The Gleaner tried to get a response from D.C. the DAY BEFORE (i.e., SUNDAY)?

How many people do you suppose are waiting around on a weekend to coordinate between HHS and State in order to let deportees back into the country a mere six months after their deportation?

MH - Generals Get A Pass On Abu Ghraib Abuse, Commanders Share Blame For Detainee Mistreatment

http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/opinion/11488907.htm

Miami Herald
April 26, 2005

Generals Get A Pass On Abu Ghraib Abuse
Commanders Share Blame For Detainee Mistreatment

If the generals aren't responsible for the conduct of U.S. troops in a combat zone, pray tell, who is? So far, only one brigade-level general has been reprimanded and five rank-and-file soldiers convicted in the shocking mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib and other facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two other soldiers have courts-martial scheduled for next month. But a yet-to-be-released Army inspector-general's report apparently concludes that none of the top senior officers in Iraq should bear responsibility for the scandalous breakdown in military discipline and abrogation of U.S. prisoner policy.

Unacceptable outcome

The report concludes that neither Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the former senior commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, nor his three senior commanders are liable for the abuses, according to sources. In other words, the most senior persons who are in a position to implement and supervise U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan aren't responsible for an embarrassing failure in the actual execution of policy. This is unacceptable. It would be as if the captain of a ship were not held liable for crew members who beat up detainees held in the brig.

This last analogy for command responsibility hits the nail right on the head. It's the command responsibility, stupid! If they don't exercise it or are held responsible for it, why do they get the big bucks?

We're not looking for scapegoats here. Lt. Gen. Sanchez and his senior commanders are excellent officers with heretofore unblemished records. But the idea of senior military commanders not having to share responsibility for the actions of their troops violates fundamental principles of U.S. military organization. Generals are required to maintain effective command and control of their troops at all times. The military hierarchy dictates maximum control, and the Army's success depends on it.

Even if the commanders had no direct knowledge of soldiers' individual abusive actions against the detainees, they were responsible for providing resources for the troops -- including effective discipline and training -- and planning all details of the units' operations. With respect to U.S. intelligence gathering, the commanding officers were responsible for policy that described what interrogation techniques could be used or not used -- including dogs -- and what kinds and amounts of pressure were acceptable to get useful information from detainees. Given the political pressure from Washington to produce better intelligence, the commanders had a clear duty to define how that would be done and know how those orders were being carried out.

The provision of adequate resources as an integral part of planning for the postwar period is where so many things broke down. As USMC Gen. Pace put it: "Hope is not a plan." Although some neocons had visions of our troops being greeted as liberators (which did in fact occur, although it was quickly eclipsed by looting and chaos which swiftly soured many Iraqis on their liberation), the oil paying the costs of the occupation and reconstruction, and other best-case-scenario rose-colored-glasses-style thinking, Clausewitz's "friction" and Murphy's Law combined to another result.

Congressional inquiry

The scandals at Abu Ghraib and other facilities have prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to propose an overhaul of the military's detention operations. An overhaul obviously is needed. But the Army inspector general's report mustn't be the last word on the scandal. Congress, which thus far hasn't had much to say about the issue, should pursue its own investigation of the abuse.

LAT - High Court Dismisses POWs' Torture Claim Against Iraq, The White House had argued against a $1-billion verdict won after the 1991 Gulf War

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-scotus26apr26,1,4026766.story?coll=la-headlines-nation&ctrack=2&cset=true

Los Angeles Times
April 26, 2005

High Court Dismisses POWs' Torture Claim Against Iraq
The White House had argued against a $1-billion verdict won after the 1991 Gulf War.

By David G. Savage, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Seventeen members of the U.S. military who were taken prisoner and tortured by the Iraqis during the 1991 Persian Gulf War lost their legal battle to hold Iraq liable for their detention and injuries as the Supreme Court on Monday turned away their final appeal.

The justices heeded the advice of the Bush administration and let stand an appeals court ruling that threw out a nearly $1-billion verdict won by the former POWs two years ago.
The court's refusal to hear the case spares the administration from having to go before the justices to argue against Americans who had been tortured.

The former POWs sued Iraq and the regime of Saddam Hussein under the terms of a 1996 anti-terrorism law that opened the courthouse door to claims from Americans injured or tortured at the hands of "state sponsors of terror."

Their story was little known, since most Americans perceived the Persian Gulf War as a TV spectacular in which U.S. forces pounded and destroyed Iraq's army in a few weeks.

But during their time in captivity, the plaintiffs said, they were beaten and had their bones broken by their Iraqi captors. Several of the men nearly starved in the weeks they were held in cold, filthy cells, including at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.

But by the time the men won their claim in court — and were to be paid out of the Hussein regime assets that had been frozen as punishment for the invasion of Kuwait — the U.S. had invaded Iraq and toppled the government. To the former POWs' surprise, the Bush administration went to court seeking to nullify the award. The government argued that Iraq, under American occupation, was no longer a state sponsor of terrorism.

Moreover, President Bush canceled the sanctions against Iraq imposed at the end of the Gulf War and moved to shield the $1.7 billion in frozen assets that, the administration said, was needed to rebuild the nation.

As much as I hate to say it, the court and Pres. Bush have a point, but that should be only a mitigating factor that might cause a reduction in the per victim payout. I'd like to see an even $10 million per victim.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with the administration last year and ruled that "weighty foreign policy interests" called for dismissing the lawsuit.
In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that U.S. law and the Geneva Convention forbade the torture of POWs and prohibited nations from absolving perpetrators of torture of their legal liability.

"Our country does not have a good record for holding nations accountable for how they have treated American captives," lead plaintiff Clifford Acree, a Marine lieutenant colonel when he was captured, said recently.

Unfortunately, LTC Acree is historically correct.

Shot down over Iraq by a surface-to-air missile on Jan. 17, 1991, the first day of the war, Acree was injured when he ejected from his jet; after his capture, he was blindfolded and beaten by the Iraqis until he lost consciousness. He was held captive for 47 days.

In a recent news briefing, Acree argued that if the lawsuit were dismissed, "what message do we send for the future?"

Answer: that outlaw regimes who violate civilized norms for the protection of prisoners of war and other protected persons need fear no consequence? When will we get the opportunity to try former Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein? Certainly he has some "command responsibility" issues in this regard.

The former POWs had the support of a bipartisan group of lawmakers, including Sens. George Allen (R-Va.), Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Patty Murray (D-Wash.), who filed a friend-of-the-court brief urging the justices to restore the verdict.

Keep your eye on Sen. Allen, he's a possible presidential candidate not too far down the road.

Last month, Bush administration lawyers urged the court to dismiss the case.
They said "the presidential determination [that canceled the sanctions] reflects a most profound shift in the [government's] foreign policy toward Iraq — from viewing it as an enemy to a state subject to our protection."

In a one-line order Monday, the high court turned down the appeal in Acree vs. Iraq and the United States.

"The court's decision … sends the wrong message to those who would torture or kill Americans," said Paul Kamenar, counsel for the Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative advocacy group that filed the brief for the lawmakers on behalf of the onetime POWs. He called the decision unfortunate.

Although the trial judge who heard the case awarded damages that totaled nearly $1 billion, lawyers for the former POWs told government officials that they would settle the claim for a fraction of that amount.

The lawyers said administration officials refused to discuss a settlement.

Monday's dismissal ends the lawsuit. The plaintiffs will receive no money.

See my earlier posting: "POW Claims Bump Into Foreign Policy" at (http://consul-at-arms.blogspot.com/2005_04_03_consul-at-arms_archive.html)

Spelunka Leonis discussed this also at: http://spelunkaleonis.blogspot.com/2005/04/litiginous-americans-abroad.html

Southern Maryland Celtic Festival and Gathering of the Clans, Sat., April 30, 2005, 10:00 a.m. - 6:00 p.m.

http://cssm.org/festival/index.htm

"April 30, 2005 - Celtic Festival and Highland Gathering of Southern Maryland- the oldest Celtic celebration in Maryland: Chosen in 2000 by CongressmanSteny Hoyer to represent Southern Maryland in the national 'Local Legacy'project of the Library of Congress' Bicentennial celebration, The SouthernMaryland Celtic Festival and Highland Gathering highlights the heritage ofthe Scots, Irish, Welsh, Manx, Bretton, Cornish and British. The Festivalis held from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the 560-acre Jefferson PattersonPark and Museum, 10515 Mackall Road, St. Leonard, MD. For a brochure write:The Celtic Festival, P.O. Box 209, Prince Frederick, MD 20678, or telephone443-404-7319. E-mail address is: Festival@CSSM.org" (http://thecapitalscot.com/)

Come to the Southern Maryland Celtic Festival and try to pick-out Consul-At-Arms: he'll be the one wearing a kilt!

Explanation of Links, part the 20th, Daily Demarch

http://dailydemarche.blogspot.com/

How many good things can I say about my colleagues at Daily Demarche, whom I've never, to my uncertain knowledge, actually met?

They are a beacon of light, shining in the sometimes dark and overly liberal wilderness of the Department.

Cheers!

Booknotes: Collapse by Jared Diamond

Collapse, by Jared Diamond.

http://a1204.g.akamai.net/7/1204/1401/05020810011/images.barnesandnoble.com/images/9030000/9035923.jpg

I had intended to write a little bit about Diamond's "Collapse," but discovered how well Malcolm Gladwell has already done the job: http://www.gladwell.com/2005/2005_01_15_a_collapse.html

Let me add just this little bit: with regards to the Rwandan genocide, Diamond's take, that environmental and population pressures, as distinct from tribal strife, played a much more significant role than most of us have previously heard.

Diamond's "Guns, Germs and Steel" put him on the map and establishes his worldwide reputation as an academic to be read carefully. While his domestic political views shine through "Collapse" in spots, he comes by them honestly rather than being an ideologue.

This entire book should be read by any thinking person, especially those possessing that pearl of great price; that is to say, the right to vote, whether as a legislator or citizen. For foreign service officers, the section dealing with the Rwandan genocide makes an important companion piece to Dallaire's "Shake Hands With The Devil" and Powers' "Problem From Hell."

Cheers!

An Unabridged Unofficial Dictionary for Marines

A useful link for those wishing to better understand the language of U.S. Marines.

http://4mermarine.com/USMC/dictionary.html

Gulf War II: "Was This Trip Really Necessary?"

Gulf War II: "Was This Trip Really Necessary?"

by Consul-At-Arms

A constant refrain in media since the most recent invasion of Iraq has been that the war in Iraq is either illegal, unnecessary, unprovoked or worse.

As someone called back into uniform to serve in what was later named "Operation Iraqi Freedom" (OIF), I found, at the time, within myself a certain sympathy with that view. Being mobilized was, to say the least, a matter of significant personal inconvenience as well as, later on, some hazard to myself and many others with whom I have considerable ties of affection and comradeship, one of whom did not survive our deployment.

In the course of my service I had lengthy opportunity to reflect upon and revise that perspective as to the war's necessity. Let me make and take this opportunity to share some of my thoughts on the matter.

Why Iraq?

Following the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., it was at last crystal clear to America's citizenry and political leadership that we were at war.

The only question was with whom (or what) it was, exactly, that we were at war. The answer varies, depending upon whom is asked, from a network of trained terrorists, sympathizers, supporting governments and non-governmental organizations (i.e., Al-Qaida) to our own capitalist system and support for Israel which in some convolution of thought brought the attack upon ourselves. For further exploration of this tortuously convoluted and poisonous line of thought, consult the speeches of Ward Churchill.

As someone who'd been aware of Al-Qaida since the bombing attacks against our diplomatic missions in Kenya and Tanzania, learning they were responsible for the 9/11 attacks was considerably less of a shock than the attacks themselves. Therefore our attack against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, the primary state sponsor of Al-Qaida, seemed clearly warranted, given several considerations:

First, that Al-Qaida was responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

Second, that Afghanistan was a state sponsor of Al-Qaida. I would argue that Afghanistan was the primary state sponsor of Al-Qaida in terms of physical support such as national sanctuary, training establishments and the like. I would further argue that Sudan was, at least for certain periods, also a state sponsor in similar fashion, although by that late date, Afghanistan had replaced them in most, if not all, respects.

Third, that the U.S. Congress had, on September 15, 2001, made a joint resolution authorizing President Bush "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." (http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/15/congress.terrorism/)

And so it was done. And let's keep the above congressional resolution in mind, as it, in my loose summation, authorizes the President to "put the smackdown" on pretty-much anyone or ones who had anything to do with supporting or facilitating the 9/11 attacks or who had sheltered or aided them.

And Iraq was to be next.

President Bush was fairly clear in his State of the Union address in January 2002, the famed "Axis of Evil" speech, wherein he named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of evil".

"North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.

Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom.

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world." (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html).

Conspicuously absent from this list, this "axis," were both Libya and Syria.

One can argue against the axis of evil formulation of various grounds, such as, for instance, that of engineering: that an axis has only two ends. Historically that didn't matter, as when Tokyo was perceived to join the Berlin-Rome axis prior-to and during World War II.

Some have argued that North Korea doesn't belong on such an axis as that of Iran and Iraq, or even that Iran and Iraq, historic and recent enemies, don't belong on the same axis. Such arguments miss the point: each of these nation's leaderships saw us as their enemy and acted accordingly, even to the extremes of cooperating with one another from time to time, as it suits them. And two of them still do.

There are a number of rationales for Iraq being next, after Afghanistan, on the Global War On Terror (GWOT) "to-do" list.

First, I would mention that we (the original 1st Gulf War coalition) had been in a state of hostilities with Iraq from the time of Gulf War I (GW1).

GW1 was ended with a ceasefire and then a truce agreement. Not a capitulation and never a peace treaty.

Said truce agreement was violated constantly by the Hussein regime. For over the next decade, one found one's morning newspaper would periodically include a brief mention that U.S. or British warplanes had been fired upon or "lit-up" by Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) radar and responded. Usually they responded by destroying the radar transmitter arrays themselves. This is reminiscent of Soviet doctrine for jamming radio transmitters, which involved artillery barrages, but I digress . . .

The Kurdish north of Iraq was freed from Saddamite oppression and persecution (as well as aperiodic genocide) by the northern "No Fly" zone. This allowed a decade-long flowering of prosperity and peace.

So Iraq represented unfinished business for the U.S. That alone merited it the number one place on the "axis of evil" hit parade. Related factors included that U.S. forces were already familiar with the region and had considerable support and preparation already accomplished as part of contingency planning in the event of a resumption of active hostilities and pursuant to the security of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Second, was the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) argument. Included in the rationale for going to war with Iraq was the claim that Iraq was developing WMDs and thus represented a clear threat to the U.S.

This rationale seemed to get the most ink and airtime in print and other media, to the exclusion of other legitimate reasons. My personal impression is that the media found this argument the most convincing, the most "sexy," and was possessed of the mistaken impression that it understood this rationale the best.

Saddam had used WMDs before, after all, against the Iranians during the long Iran-Iraq War and against his own, primarily Kurdish, Iraqi civilians.

He was supposed, pursuant to the truce agreement and a grab bag of U.N. resolutions, to cease WMD development, dismantle his development programs, and destroy any stocks of WMD he might possess.

Media coverage since the fall of Baghdad has proved the opposite of at least two of my three arguments as to just why the media finding the WMD rationale so alluring.

The post-war evidence proved to be less than convincing, particularly in light of the paucity of evidence of any WMD stockpiles or development programs by the Iraq Security Group (ISG).

This made the argument a lot less sexy.

And other developments made it clear that the media lacks any clear understanding of WMD.

On the other hand, I do have an understanding of WMD. Once upon a time, my original Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) was that of Atomic Demolition and Munitions Specialist (12E). "Twelve Echos" were an elite group within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in those days before the development of the Sapper Leader Course. But I digress . . . suffice it to say that I have a hands-on knowledge of nuclear weapons at the tactical level as well as some understanding of their strategic employment and functional and theoretical workings. Additionally, as an undergraduate freshman engineering major the year prior to my enlistment, I had written a paper on the Manhatten Project, so I'm not utterly ignorant of the physics and engineering requirements for an atomic WMD program.

In the years since, my additional duties as a non-commissioned officer for a period of years included that of "NBC Decontamination Team Chief" for my Military Intelligence (MI) company in the Army Reserve. NBC is an acronym meaning "nuclear-biological-chemical." So I have a "greater-than-the-average-joe-on-the-street" understanding of the other forms of WMD as well.

WMD includes chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear or radiological weapons.

Since CNN was unable to get footage of a ICBM's rolling off of a PANTEX-style assembly line (http://www.pantex.com/), then there must have been no WMDs.

Right.

There's a little thing like the difficulty (nearing an impossibility) of proving a negative, but we'll gloss over that for now.
WMDs were discovered in Iraq.

a. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4997808/
b. http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/5/17/152705.shtml
c. http://www.katc.com/global/story.asp?s=1873019&ClientType=Printable
d. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33082-2004May17.html
e. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,120137,00.html
f. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,120268,00.html
g. http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0521/p09s01-coop.html

They just happened to be have been older, chemical (nerve agent) munitions. Which Saddam wasn't supposed to have either.

This leads me to my "moving the goalposts" gripe regarding the media.

These chemical WMDs weren't or aren't good enough, apparently, to prove that Saddam had WMDs, although they demonstrate he actually did possess them.

Their very existance proves that he had them. But we hear nothing but that he did not.

They were too old, although he wasn't supposed to have them at all.

They didn't represent an on-going WMD development program, although if he had them, he clearly didn't need to develop them much further, did he?

This is why I call this, moving the goalposts.

There are those who argue that WMD stockpiles and/or production facilities were either destroyed by Saddam before the U.S.-lead invasion or spirited out of Iraq, perhaps to Syria, perhaps by Russian special forces. Maybe. Maybe not. It's also argued that Iraq is a big place (it is) and these unfound facilities or weapons could still be hidden, perhaps buried in the desert, perhaps hidden, mislabeled, in one of the hundreds of ordinary munitions storage sites.

I don't care.

I don't care because, a.) a nerve agent weapon that wasn't supposed to be there did in fact exist and was discovered, more than once; and, b.) the WMD threat as rationale for invasion never impressed me that much anyways.

Others, of a more geopolitical bent, saw our regime-change in Iraq as the beginning of something beautiful: that democracy could be introduced there, nurtured there, and, like a contagion, would spread therefrom throughout the despotic Middle East in sort of a reverse "domino theory."

As a reason to invade, that argument never impressed me much either. It is, however, a much hoped-for side effect and benefit that seems to have legs of its own.

Libya has foresworn and disavowed, after, finally, admitting its own WMD development programs, and is seeking normalized relations with the Free World.

Saudi Arabia has had its first popular elections, for representative assemblies, in basically forever. Our Saudi friends have a long way to go in this regard, but every journey begins with, well, you know.

And Lebanon. The Cedar Revolution. Syria has today withdrawn the last of its military units from Lebanon, with intelligence units to follow.

None of these things suffices, even together, in my opinion as reason to invade Iraq in the first place, but they kind of make you glad that you did, after the fact.

The essential reason I believe that invading Iraq was the right thing to do is that I believe to have been a supporter of Al-Qaida.

I don't posit that Saddam anyone in Iraq necessarily knew of the planned 9/11 attacks. Nor do I even necessarily care whether specific support given by Iraq to Al-Qaida went towards the 9/11 attacks. But I do believe that agents and agencies of the Ba'athist government of Iraq, lead by Saddam Hussein, provided support to Al-Qaida and had continuing contacts with them, as they do today as part of the terrorist insurrection lead, at least in part by Al-Qaida's Usama Bin Ladin-appointed "emir" for Iraq, Al-Zarkawi.

Support is fungible, particularly financial support.

While in Iraq I read Stephen Hayes' article in The Weekly Standard (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/378fmxyz.asp). I found that sufficient grounds to make the case of official Iraqi support to Al-Qaida. Recall my so-named "smackdown" authority cited above and provided to President Bush by Congress. Enough said.

Update: Mr. Hayes has published an update to his Weekly Standard article, again in the Weekly Standard; see: http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/804yqqnr.asp; and http://consul-at-arms.blogspot.com/2005/07/ws-mother-of-all-connections.html.

As a diplomat, I found the following portion of the Hayes article particularly compelling:

"One example. The memo contains only one paragraph on Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, the Iraqi facilitator who escorted two September 11 hijackers through customs in Kuala Lumpur. U.S. intelligence agencies have extensive reporting on his activities before and after the September 11 hijacking. That they would include only this brief overview suggests the 16-page memo, extensive as it is, just skims the surface of the reporting on Iraq-al Qaeda connections.

Other intelligence reports indicate that Shakir whisked not one but two September 11 hijackers--Khalid al Midhar and Nawaq al Hamzi--through the passport and customs process upon their arrival in Kuala Lumpur on January 5, 2000. Shakir then traveled with the hijackers to the Kuala Lumpur Hotel where they met with Ramzi bin al Shibh, one of the masterminds of the September 11 plot. The meeting lasted three days. Shakir returned to work on January 9 and January 10, and never again.

Shakir got his airport job through a contact at the Iraqi Embassy. (Iraq routinely used its embassies as staging grounds for its intelligence operations; in some cases, more than half of the alleged "diplomats" were intelligence operatives.) The Iraqi embassy, not his employer, controlled Shakir's schedule. He was detained in Qatar on September 17, 2001. Authorities found in his possession contact information for terrorists involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 embassy bombings, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, and the September 11 hijackings. The CIA had previous reporting that Shakir had received a phone call from the safe house where the 1993 World Trade Center attacks had been plotted.

The Qataris released Shakir shortly after his arrest. On October 21, 2001, he flew to Amman, Jordan, where he was to change planes to a flight to Baghdad. He didn't make that flight. Shakir was detained in Jordan for three months, where the CIA interrogated him. His interrogators concluded that Shakir had received extensive training in counter-interrogation techniques. Not long after he was detained, according to an official familiar with the intelligence, the Iraqi regime began to "pressure" Jordanian intelligence to release him. At the same time, Amnesty International complained that Shakir was being held without charge. The Jordanians released him on January 28, 2002, at which point he is believed to have fled back to Iraq. "

This kind of official assistance to an Al-Qaida operative by Iraqi diplomatic agents put the finishing touch on my change-of-heart (not to mention mind) about the necessity for regime-change in Iraq, even if it meant invasion. I would note that the article was published in November 2003, some seven months after the invasion and six months into my year in Iraq.

I could go on to list Saddam's many crimes, against humanity, against the environment, against Iran, against the Kurds, against his own people and society; actually I couldn't really do that, other than by general categories. The mass graves should speak for themselves, but then we really always knew they were there, those who cared to know about it. Saddam was always a bad guy. Realpolitik dictated, once upon a time, that the U.S. deal with him when Iran was seen as the greater enemy, but even that eventually changed. Saddam being a bad guy was never enough of a reason to go to the other side of the world to invade his country, but it's a reason to be glad that eventually we did.

I should close by mentioning the most ludicrous reason that critics give for our having invaded Iraq.

Oil.

Supposedly we were invading in order to steal Iraq's oil.

Unfortunately, some in the Bush administration fed into this fantasy by publicly speculating that our invasion, occupation, and/or reconstruction would somehow pay for itself through the sale of Iraqi oil.

That hasn't happened. For various reasons.

But I always thought believing it as a reason was just plain stupid.

Even today, the U.S. isn't stealing the oil; what Iraqi oil the U.S. might get is paid for in U.S. dollars. And, although I'm no economist or serious student of the world petroleum industry, but I suspect that the markets for Iraqi oil were and are a lot closer, say Europe and Asia, than the U.S.

Addition:

I should further mention something about what Al-Qaida is, and what it is not.

Explanation of Links, part the 19th, Dagger JAG

http://www.daggerjag.blogspot.com/

Dagger JAG is an interesting weblog generated by a Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps officer (a.k.a. a military lawyer) deployed to Iraq.

As of this writing, he hasn't posted in some months. Here's hoping he's alright and resumes posting soon.

WP - Private Security Workers Living On Edge In Iraq, Downing of Helicopter Shows Heightened Risks

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10547-2005Apr22.html

Washington Post
April 23, 2005 Pg. 1

Private Security Workers Living On Edge In Iraq
Downing of Helicopter Shows Heightened Risks

By Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post Staff Writer

BAGHDAD -- Cruising toward Baghdad in the belly of a Spanish turboprop plane with a dozen other private security contractors from Blackwater USA, Rich, a 43-year-old former Navy commando, squinted out the window at the Euphrates River.

The Casa 212 dove 12,000 feet toward Baghdad airport in a drunken, corkscrew landing. A short while later, Rich was riding shotgun in the back of one of Blackwater's South African-made armored Mamba vehicles along the main highway to the capital, one of the most dangerous roads in Iraq.

"I like being some place where stupidity can be fatal, because here you work with people who think about their actions," said Rich, who asked for security reasons that only his first name be used. He and his colleagues voice disdain for what they consider the soft, even pampered lives of most Americans in a society he sums up as one that "puts warnings on coffee cups."
Rich is typical of the men drawn to Blackwater USA and scores of other private security firms now doing a booming business in Iraq. They're driven by money and a lust for life on the edge, but also by a self-styled altruism. Sporting blue jeans, wraparound sunglasses and big tattoos, they look the part of gun-slinging cowboys -- but most are experienced enough to know that a hot-dog attitude is the fastest way to get yourself and others killed.

This knowledge is the mark (one of many) of professionals in the military game. Most of the civilian security contractors I encountered were ex-military and quite professional.

With more hired guns in Iraq than in any other U.S. conflict since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Rich and other armed contractors also admit their role is cloudy and controversial. They do shoot to kill, but they aren't legally considered combatants. U.S. military officials have expressed concern about violence in which the private contractors open fire. The contractors' mission is to protect the lives of individuals and cargo but not necessarily to support the broader interests of the U.S. counterinsurgency.

And yet, they will. At least to the extent of supporting the broader interests, such as survival, of the U.S. and Coalition forces.

"hired guns?" Well, at least there's no evidence of bias in this article.

For more than a year now, Rich has traveled across Iraq, guarding the former U.S. occupation authority chief, L. Paul Bremer, and other high-ranking diplomats. He plans to make a career at Blackwater despite the fact that 18 of his close co-workers have now perished on the job, including four whose bodies were hung in Fallujah last April from what is now called Blackwater Bridge and six who were killed when a helicopter they were riding in was shot down outside Baghdad on Thursday.

Indeed, with an estimated 240 deaths among some 20,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq, Rich's work is statistically riskier than that of the U.S. military, as firms such as Blackwater take on a historically unprecedented role in the Iraq war. Blackwater has an average of 1,300 employees on a given day, spread out over seven countries, the firm says. That number includes hundreds in Iraq.

"We have to be willing to go abroad to fight, to go after these guys here so my family at home can stay safe," Rich said. He left the Navy SEALs in the mid-1990s to save his marriage, he said. But after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, he said he felt compelled to leave the Virginia cell phone company he worked for and put his military skills to use.

Not every patriot need rush the recruiting office. In the case of someone like "Rich," he's probably ineligible or overage from his prior service, if not actually retired.

Making Hay

As the Blackwater convoy sped down the airport highway, John "Tool" Freeman, a red-headed ex-Marine, was at the wheel of the lead Mamba, a high-riding, $70,000 armored vehicle designed to withstand antitank mines.

Used by the South African military in Angola, the vehicle is Blackwater's primary means of zipping State Department employees and other nations' diplomats to Baghdad's fortified Green Zone. For additional protection, the convoys are shadowed by helicopters with armed guards perched at the open doors scanning for potential attackers.

Freeman, of Portsmouth, Va., said he joined Blackwater after seeing some Marines on television during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. "I'd been missing it for a while," he recalled. "I said 'Man, I really need to get back into this.' " But with average pay of $500 to $600 a day, he said, the money was also a big draw for him and his buddies. He said he planned to work for Blackwater for three years to save up cash for retirement -- and a sailboat.

"Most of us have a plan -- it's like, make hay while the sun shines," he said.

Freeman blasted the Mamba's air-horn to force several Iraqi vehicles off the highway. "We beep the horn and flash the lights or push them off the shoulder to keep a buffer between us. Our main threat is the car bomb," he said, adding, "We've had cars cross three lanes of traffic to come after us."

In charge of the daily airport runs, Freeman studies military and private intelligence reports and maps the locations of attacks to look for patterns. He also videotapes the route and watches the tape later to look for possible threats he missed. Such precautions are necessary, private contractors say, as they become more frequent targets of insurgent attacks.

Taping convoy routes seems like an excellent procedure, one which our military convoys might emulate.

"We're seeing personal security teams are getting hit more," said Richard Hicks, Blackwater's operations manager in Baghdad. "There's been a definite increase in attacks, to hit us where it hurts the most."

This, to a certain extent, is likely one result of improved and improving security on the part of military forces. Badguys are like water that way, always seeking a weakspot, somewhere to leak through.

At the same time, Hicks said, contractors are under pressure to curb their aggressive methods, although they lack the firepower and backup enjoyed by the U.S. military. Early in the Iraq conflict and up until last year, "there were no rules" limiting contractors' use of force in Iraq, Hicks said. More recently, the State Department imposed restrictions discouraging the contractors from firing warning shots. There are still daily reports of contractors running Iraqis off the road or injuring or killing innocent people, he said.

"Now it's all about accountability," he said at Blackwater's Baghdad team house in the Green Zone, not far from the crossed-sabers archway, a symbol of the era of ousted president Saddam Hussein.

On Their Own

At the team house, the large, comfortable, but simple home of a former Baath Party member, Blackwater employees relax in the evening, eating home-cooked meals of stuffed tomatoes, chicken or hamburgers prepared by an Iraqi staff. Unlike the U.S. military, Blackwater has a far smaller logistical support system and purchases food and other supplies directly from Iraqi sources.

Employees of Blackwater, based in Moyock, N.C., and other private security firms said they were more flexible, efficient and, in many cases, more experienced than U.S. military forces in Iraq. With many of their members former Navy SEALs or Army Green Berets, their teams are small, tight-knit, and responsive both by choice and necessity -- if they get in a tough spot, they can't depend on U.S. troops to come to their aid, they say.

Many recalled an incident in April 2004 when eight Blackwater employees fought off a major insurgent assault on the U.S. government compound in Najaf by the militia of the radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr. Blackwater pilots flew in ammunition and evacuated the wounded without any U.S. military support, they said.

They definitely earned their pay that day, while some of _our_ aviation units were unwilling to fly-in such things as, say, ammunition.

Rich and others said they were frequently fired upon by U.S. soldiers and Marines at checkpoints. "I've been shot at numerous times by our troops, and that's in a black Suburban with American flags," Rich said. Still, they say cooperation with the U.S. military on the ground is largely positive and voiced sympathy for the far younger, low-paid U.S. servicemen, who they say regularly approach them asking about jobs at Blackwater.
Vetting for Blackwater hires is rigorous, said Hicks, a former police chief in Pennsylvania. While the money was a key reason he joined, , he said, "Once you get here the money isn't really an issue, because you could be dead the next day."

At the Bristol Hotel in Amman, Jordan, where Blackwater employees transit to and from Iraq, J.D. Stratton, a burly company manager, said 10 percent of Blackwater hires may be unqualified "chuckleheads" who just happen to make it through the screening.
"But they'll eventually be caught," said Stratton, whose nickname is "Terminator" because it is his job to dismiss those who don't work out. "If I show up at your doorstep, you are out of there," he said.

Alcohol abuse and a defiant attitude tend to be the main reasons people are fired, he said, relaxing with other employees at Harry's Jazz Bar. "You have to be disciplined to do this job. If any one of them is a cowboy he will . . . get everyone killed."

WP - A 'Peaceful Rise'?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10699-2005Apr22.html

Washington Post
April 23, 2005 Pg. 18

A 'Peaceful Rise'?

CHINA'S PROMISE of a "peaceful rise" to great power status sounded reassuring when it was first articulated by President Hu Jintao. As it has taken on substance over the past several years it has rung increasingly hollow. Mr. Hu's idea of "peaceful" so far has included the blunt suppression of democracy in Hong Kong; outreach to rogue regimes around the world, such as Iran and Sudan; double-digit annual increases in defense spending; adoption of a law committing China to a war of aggression against democratic Taiwan if it fails to satisfy Beijing's demands; and now, the crude use of nationalist sentiment to intimidate Japan. Far from ensuring stability, Mr. Hu's policy risks polarizing the region and forcing the United States and other outside powers to choose sides.

Watch this space. China, demographically and economically, is the 800 lbs. gorilla.

No one should wish for such an outcome, but if it comes to that, the choice shouldn't be hard. Japan's democratic government, like Taiwan's, poses no threat to its neighbors, and Tokyo has shown a growing willingness in recent years to contribute to regional and global security. Though its nationalists still try to play down Japan's criminal aggression in the 1930s and '40s, and some textbooks cater to them, the government has repeatedly apologized to its neighbors for the offenses that occurred 60 and 70 years ago. On Friday Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi reiterated those apologies in an effort to defuse tensions with Beijing and pave the way for a meeting with Mr. Hu.

Japan seems to have something of a blind spot as to how glaring its omissions in facing up to its previous imperialist past are in the eyes of its neighbors, generally the former victims of that imperialist past.

China has responded grudgingly to such conciliatory gestures, even though the crisis between the two countries -- the worst since they established diplomatic relations in 1972 -- is almost entirely of Beijing's making. It was Mr. Hu's government that chose to make an exaggerated fuss over the textbook issue, then allowed and even encouraged demonstrators to attack Japanese diplomatic missions and restaurants in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities. The popular hostility toward Japan that erupted in the streets was real enough, but Mr. Hu's government made the dangerous and irresponsible decision to stoke it and employ it for its own ends. These ends include thwarting Japan's justifiable bid to become a member of the U.N. Security Council and using nationalism to prolong one-party rule by the Communist Party.

There's nothing quite like a spontaneous demonstration, riot, and sacking of foreign diplomatic establishments, particularly as practised in countries like China, where the spontaneous demonstrators are often organized by their workplace or university dormitory party leaders and bused to the targeted facilities.

Concern that the demonstrations might get out of hand and turn against the government seems to have motivated Mr. Hu finally to rein them in: Official statements now warn against "unauthorized" protests. But there is no indication that the Chinese leadership has absorbed the larger lesson: that crude bullying of Hong Kong, Taiwan or Japan is not a path to greater influence, much less a "peaceful rise," by China. It is, rather, a formula for uniting most of Asia and eventually the United States in an attempt to contain Chinese belligerence. That would be a bad outcome for the United States, for China, and for Asian and global security. Whether it can be avoided depends mostly on whether Mr. Hu can recognize and learn from a string of mistakes.

JG - McCook is (Jamaica's) first resident ambassador to China

http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20050423/news/news1.html

McCook is first resident ambassador to China

published: Saturday April 23, 2005

WAYNE MCCOOK has been appointed Jamaica's first resident ambassador to the People's Republic of China.

This is an interesting reciprocal development in light of reports that China is making increasing diplomatic and commercial inroads in the areas of the Caribbean as well as Central and South America.

Mr. McCook, who is acting undersecretary in the foreign ministry, is expected to take up duties in June when the embassy is scheduled to commence operations in Beijing.

Mr. McCook's appointment and the establishment of the embassy are occurring as Jamaica and China are engaged in deepening cooperation and economic ties.

A small, but growing and economically significant minority of Jamaica's population is of Chinese origin.

China's Vice-President, Zeng Qinghong, paid a visit to Jamaica during the country's hosting of the China/Caribbean Forum and Eco-nomic Trade Fair, which was held in Kingston from February 2-5.

It is envisaged that Jamaica could become a major light manufacturing and transshipment point for Chinese goods entering the hemisphere.

COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

Jamaica and China signed a number of cooperation agreements covering a wide range of areas, including a memorandum of understanding which will facilitate Chinese tourism to Jamaica.

Mr. McCook is a career diplomat. Prior to his current position as acting undersecretary for trade, he held a number of positions in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, including senior director of the Foreign Trade Department; director, Caribbean and Americas Department; minister/deputy head of mission, Embassy of Jamaica to the United States of America; and minister/deputy permanent representative, Permanent Mission of Jamaica to the United Nations, New York.

Mr. McCook, was also acting executive director of the Broadcasting Commission, on secondment from the ministry

JG - The Muslim way in Jamaica

http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20050423/(spirit)/(spirit)1.html

The Muslim way in Jamaica

published: Saturday April 23, 2005

Worshippers bow in prayers yesterday during a service at the mosque at 24 Camp Road in Kingston.

Mark Dawes, Staff Reporter

TELEVISION images sometimes portray the religion of Islam as a barbaric religion, which endorses suicide-bombings of innocent persons, and the amputation of limbs for even minor offences.

But, that is a false image of Islam, says Mustafa Muhammad, president of the Islamic Council of Jamaica.

The taking of one's life, he said, is contrary to the teachings of the Koran, the holy book of the Islamic faith. It is one of the offences against Allah for which there can be no forgiveness, Mr. Muhammad told The Gleaner in an interview.

I've got to get a copy of Mr. Muhammad's version of the Koran. I bought mine from an Iraqi. In Iraq.

Accordingly, he said, the practice of suicide-bombings against Israelis and against the American occupation of Iraq ­ have no foundation in orthodox Islamic doctrines.

It's so nice to hear this sort of thing from an Islamic leader at all, even if he's from a rather out-of-the-way part of world islam.

Mr. Muhammad, who has been president of the Islamic Council of Jamaica for the past nine years said, "If Jamaica becomes an Islamic republic, I guarantee you, 90 per cent of the crime wave we are currently experiencing would disappear. Once I was in discussion with some police and I said, 'If Jamaica became an Islamic state, then a lot of you would have no work. There would be no need for so many policemen'."

Perhaps they could get jobs as religious policemen, a la Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Muhammad said Islamic states are more humane than they often seem to be. He stressed that though the penalty for theft is the severing of the hand, the State will not do so without ensuring that the one who is to lose a limb is able to secure a livelihood for himself and his dependants. The Islamic state, he said, must create the climate for a person to have a meaningful existence. If it does not do so, and this is what motivates the theft, then the state cannot apply the amputation sanction.

Furthermore, the cutting off of limbs, he said, is not applied for petty theft, but for more grievous forms of theft, such as a case where a man holds up a bank with a gun, robs and takes away the cash therein.

"Go to an Islamic country and see how many people you will be able to count with their hands amputated. It is not many. Perhaps you would see no more than 10. The punishment is there to prevent the crime. (Further-more) If a person is to be killed, it is done in the public ­ not so much for a spectacle, but it is for those who are looking on to say, 'Wow, man. If I go the route of this person, this will be my situation.' This drives fear in you," he said.

At last, someone gets the value of capital punishment.

EASIER ON THE MEN

Though, his dream is for the nation to one day become an Islamic State, he acknowledged that it is not hard to be a Muslim living in Jamaica. "As long as you are convinced that this (Islam) is the truth and this is what you want to do, and you are not being forced to do it, then it is very easy (to be a Muslim living in Jamaica). It is much easier for the male compared to the female. As long as we males wear something that conforms to the code of dress (for males) ­ a cap, a shirt, a pants and these are not too tight, then that's all right."
"The woman has to cover almost her entire body, especially when she is out in the public. When she is at home with her family she has the choice to dress down. If one was not strongly convicted in the belief that one has, this would be very hard for the woman."

While Jamaica isn't nearly as hot in terms of degrees Fahrenheit (or Celsius) as many Middle Eastern, it's definitely one of those places where "it's the heat, not the humidity." Dressing modestly as an Islamic woman has got to add a degree of difficulty. I might note that many women adherents to some of the versions of Jamaican Rasta-fari (the "Sistren") also dress modestly, in ways somewhat similar to those of Islam.

Indeed, in Christendom, it is now the norm for there to be far more women than men in church. But in Islam, the situation is different. Mr. Muhammad acknowledged that there is a preponderance of men attending the mosques of Islam. He said on a Friday, the main day of worship at the mosque located at 24 Camp Road in Kingston, there are about 100 persons present of which 90 would be men.

Mr. Muhammad explained the two faiths this way. "Christianity is more an emotional thing and women are more emotional than men. So you find that women would be more attracted to Christianity. While Islam is something that does not appeal to your emotions, it appeals to your intellect. It is something you reason out and then you come to your own conclusions. "The Muslim women are somewhat less visible than the Christian women because of the contact with the male. There are restrictions in terms of the extent to which a woman can come in contact with a male person. This has nothing to do with notions of inferiority because in Islam, whatever goes for the man also goes for the woman. If she does the same things as the man, the reward is the same. If she violates the law - the punishment is the same. In Islam there are certain functions. We are taught that the man has a certain role to play and the woman has a certain role to play. And as long as both conforms to their respective roles - there can be no problems," Mr. Muhammad said.

You've got to love that explanation. Men are rational, women are . . . emotional.

TRAVELLING THE MIDDLE PASSAGE

The local Muslim leader traces the origins of the religion in Jamaica to the days of slavery. Slaves from Africa, he said, carried the Islamic religion with them when they were transported from their homeland to Jamaica.

For an interesting, although not necessarily accurate, take on the history of Islam in Jamaica, see: http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Union/3052/JMHIS.HTM

Altogether there are 11 Muslim places of worship in Jamaica. Mr. Muhammad estimates there about 5,000 Muslims in Jamaica who practise the religion on a regular basis. But on the days when there are major festivals on the Islamic calendar, up to 10,000 Muslims living in Jamaica are known to converge at the offices of the Islamic Council of Jamaica, he said.
Muslims like other faith-groups in Jamaica are increasingly gaining official recognition. Muslim clergy can now perform weddings recognised by the State. Dovecot Memorial Park has reserved a section of that cemetery for the burial of Muslims.

Strict Muslims observe a dietary code which necessitates that certain meats be cut in a defined way. Mr. Muhammad explained through the council, certain butchers have agreed to cater to the Muslim community by ensuring that meat is cut to their specifications. Also, the council has an area where they store meat for persons who seek out their particular cut.

REACHING OUT

At present, much of the work of the council has been geared towards schools ­ primary and secondary. With the change in focus from Bible knowledge to religious studies, many schools have invited the council to explain Islam to their students. This council is happy to do so, Mr. Muhammad said. The council also, welcomes schools, which tour their facilities at their Camp Road offices in Kingston.

Islam is a proselytising religion and as such it engages in evangelism. Mr. Muhammad said that occasionally, members of the council do go to places where people congregate ­ such as a park, and hand out pamphlets about Islam and engage people in conversation to interest them in serving Allah. The trend, he said, is that some do indeed want to learn more about Islam.

Send feedback to mark.dawes@gleanerjm.com

WP - Top Army Officers Are Cleared in Abuse Cases, One General Will Likely Get Reprimand Over Abu Ghraib

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10546-2005Apr22.html

Top Army Officers Are Cleared in Abuse Cases
One General Will Likely Get Reprimand Over Abu Ghraib

By Josh White
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 23, 2005; Page A01

An Army inspector general's report has cleared senior Army officers of wrongdoing in the abuse of military prisoners in Iraq and elsewhere, government officials familiar with the findings said yesterday.

The only Army general officer recommended for punishment for the failures that led to abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison and other facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan is Brig. Gen. Janis L. Karpinski, who was in charge of U.S. prison facilities in Iraq as commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade in late 2003 and early 2004. Several sources said Karpinski is expected to receive an administrative reprimand for dereliction of duty.

So she doesn't get promoted.

The problem is that she isn't fit for the rank she already holds.

The report put no blame on Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez. (Bernd Kammerer -- AP)

__ ABU GHRAIB PROBE __ Two previous reports were issued on abuses in Iraq. One finds fault at the highest levels of the Pentagon, and a second focuses on military intelligence.•

Karpinski, who has said she would fight such a charge, did not return calls yesterday. Her attorney, Neal A. Puckett, has not seen the report but said other general officers share responsibility for shortfalls. "I don't think it's fair, and it continues to make her the scapegoat for this entire situation, which has been her feeling all along," Puckett said.

Despite her culpability, she's not wrong that other general officers, especially those who planned (or failed to do so) and resourced (or failed to do so) her brigade's prisoner detention mission.

The investigation essentially found no culpability on the part of Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and three of his senior deputies, ruling that allegations they failed to prevent or stop abuses were "unsubstantiated." A military source said a 10-member team began the investigation in October and based its conclusions on the 10 major defense inquiries into abuse and interviews with 37 senior officials, including L. Paul Bremer, who led the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The report has not been released.

Of those 10 major inquiries, the inspector general's was designed to be the Army's final word on the responsibility of senior leadership in relation to the abuses. It was the only investigation designed to assign blame, if any, within the Army's senior leadership. Questions about Sanchez's and other senior leaders' role in approving harsh interrogation tactics -- including the use of military working dogs to intimidate detainees -- have swirled since photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib surfaced almost exactly a year ago.

Army officials said yesterday that they have identified 125 soldiers and officers who were either tried at courts-martial or issued administrative punishments for detainee abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan. So far, seven low-ranking soldiers have faced the most serious charges in the sexual humiliation and physical abuse cases arising out of Abu Ghraib; five have pleaded guilty or have been found guilty, and two have courts-martial scheduled for next month. Spec. Charles A. Graner Jr., who was characterized as the ringleader of the abuses there, was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

The administrative reprimand Karpinski is expected to receive is the kind of punishment that can end a military career, and officials said it is possible she could be relieved of her command as a result.

What is her current command? Is she still brigade commander?

Sources close to the investigation said two high-ranking military intelligence officers who worked at Abu Ghraib -- Col. Thomas M. Pappas and Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan -- could face criminal charges or disciplinary measures for their roles at the prison. Both supervised interrogations, and Sanchez ultimately gave them responsibility for the entire Abu Ghraib operation.

"The dereliction happened at the brigade level and below," said one defense official familiar with the report.

In a statement released by the Army yesterday, Brig. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, the top Army spokesman, did not comment on the inspector general's findings but said the Army has thoroughly investigated the abuses. In the 10 major investigations, more than 1,700 people have been interviewed and more than 15,000 pages of documents assembled, according to the Army.

"We will not rush to judgment in these cases or in any others," Brooks said. "The recommendations and decisions are consistent with, and appropriate to, the findings of these very thorough investigations."

Top-level investigations into the abuses have largely stopped short of calling them systemic, but some found major problems with the way detention operations in Iraq were conducted after President Bush declared major combat in Iraq over in April 2003. A lack of planning and resources, the reports generally agreed, led to the U.S. detention system getting overwhelmed and fostered frustration with a lack of actionable intelligence with which to fight the insurgency. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have since proposed an overhaul of the military's wartime detention operations.

Previous inquiries have addressed the roles of distinct military disciplines at the prisons. Some of the probes identified senior leadership as being indirectly responsible for the climate that led to abuses but made no findings on culpability. Responsibility for such findings was given to the Army inspector general.

A comprehensive report about Abu Ghraib by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay concluded that there were failures at the highest levels, mainly in oversight lapses. He found that Sanchez and his deputy "failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations" and "reacted inadequately" to warnings that abuse was occurring.

Sanchez's top intelligence adviser, Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, learned of abuses in late 2003 after commissioning an independent investigation, but the Abu Ghraib abuses did not get command attention until January 2004, when a soldier turned over digital photographs of some of the abuses.

Fast, who recently assumed command of the Army's intelligence center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., also was cleared of wrongdoing.

An overarching, independent analysis of the abuses by James R. Schlesinger said senior leadership should bear responsibility. "Commanders are responsible for all their units do or fail to do, and should be held accountable for their action or inaction," the report said.
Although the Army has not officially announced the results of the investigation, senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff were briefed on the results this week, Hill staff members said. Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the committee, attended a portion of the briefing. Staff members with Sen. Carl M. Levin's (D-Mich.) office were briefed, but a spokesperson for Levin declined to comment on the issue.

Warner has been adamant about getting to the bottom of senior leadership responsibility, and he issued a statement yesterday in which he said it is "absolutely essential to determine what went wrong, up and down the chain of command, both civilian and military."

Warner did not specifically address the findings, but he vowed to have another Armed Services Committee hearing about detainee abuses after the reviews are complete, saying that he wants "to examine the adequacy of those reviews, and to offer the opportunity to senior Department and military leadership to address the issue of accountability."

NYT - Four Top Officers Cleared By Army In Prison Abuses

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/23/politics/23abuse.html?

New York Times
April 23, 2005 Pg. 1

Four Top Officers Cleared By Army In Prison Abuses

By Eric Schmitt

WASHINGTON, April 22 - A high-level Army investigation has cleared four of the five top Army officers overseeing prison policies and operations in Iraq of responsibility for the abuse of detainees there, Congressional and administration officials said Friday.

Of course they were. They weren't responsible, they were merely in command.

Among the officers was Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, who was the top commander in Iraq from June 2003 to July 2004. He was the highest-ranking officer to face allegations of leadership failure in connection with the scandal, but he was not accused of criminal misconduct.

Since when is leadership failure not criminal in the military?

Barring new evidence, the inquiry, by the Army's inspector general, effectively closes the Army's book on whether the highest-ranking officers in Iraq during the Abu Ghraib prison scandal should be held accountable for command failings described in past reviews.

What's becoming achingly clear as various IG investigations come to a close is that perhaps we're taking the wrong approach in our Inspector General investigations.

Perhaps we need Inspector Sergeant-Majors? Or Inspector Chief Warrant Officers? Someone who isn't looking for another star to wear around the Army-Navy Club.

Only one of the top five officers, whose roles the Senate Armed Services Committee had asked the Army to review, has received any punishment. That officer, Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, an Army Reserve officer who commanded the military police unit at the Abu Ghraib prison, was relieved of her command and given a written reprimand. She has repeatedly said she was made the scapegoat for the failures of superiors.

Not that I find her behavior as brigade commander excusable or comprehensible, but she's definitely the "fall guy." But since she's a reserve general officer (or a woman [or both]), she's not really one of The Club and is expendible.

The findings, which provoked outrage from some civil rights groups and Democratic aides, came nearly a year after shocking photographs of American military police officers stacking naked Iraqi prisoners in a human pyramid and of other abuses first telecast nationally. Shortly afterward, an internal Army report chronicled the virtual collapse of the command structure at Abu Ghraib, outside Baghdad, in the fall of 2003.

One thing that should be borne firmly in mind during all the MSM breastbeating about how beastly our military behaves and how our Constitutionally-protected Free Press is all that stands between us and jackbooted fascism is the following:

The press didn't break this story.

The TV networks didn't break this story.

The Pentagon gave a press conference and laid out all the pictures and evidence themselves, as the internal investigations got to the point where they were providing reports to the SecDef.

So far, only a small number of soldiers, mostly from the enlisted ranks, have faced courts-martial for their actions at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. Dozens of others have faced administrative discipline for abusing captives at other detention sites and battlefield interrogation stations across Iraq.

As they should. However they were not operating in a vacuum. Rambo aside, every soldier has a first-line supervisor.

An independent panel led by former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger concluded last August that General Sanchez had failed to make sure that his staff was dealing with Abu Ghraib's problems. A separate Army investigation, called the Kern-Fay-Jones report, found that at one point General Sanchez approved the use of severe interrogation practices that led indirectly to some of the abuses.

The Schlesinger inquiry last summer also determined that General Sanchez's deputy, Maj. Gen. Walter Wojdakowski, failed to act quickly enough to make urgent requests to higher levels for more troops at the understaffed prison.

But those inquiries were not empowered to impose any punishments; that was left up to the Army.

The new review, by the Army inspector general, Lt. Gen. Stanley E. Green, exonerated General Sanchez and General Wojdakowski of the allegations that were included in one or more of the 10 major investigations over the past year into detainee abuse.

It also found to be "unsubstantiated" allegations against Maj. Gen. Barbara G. Fast, the former chief intelligence officer in Iraq who oversaw the interrogation center at Abu Ghraib, and Col. Marc Warren, the command's top legal officer. The Schlesinger panel said Colonel Warren had failed to report prisoner abuses witnessed by the Red Cross to his boss for more than a month, and that General Fast had failed to advise General Sanchez properly about the management of interrogations at the prison.

While General Sanchez and the other top officers may not have done everything right, the inquiry said, their failures came as they struggled to combat a fast-growing insurgency and a booming prison population, all with an understaffed headquarters.

But why were they understaffed? If in fact they were. The hardest thing to find in the U.S. military is an understaffed headquarters. But you can always find one that thinks it doesn't have enough people and body-snatches personnel from its subordinate units and headquarters elements to make up for the "shortfall."

So the story is what? It wasn't my fault and even if it was my responsibility I need a bigger staff?

But some Democratic aides on Capitol Hill, civil rights groups and lawyers for lower-ranking soldiers who have been disciplined voiced dismay on Friday at the findings, which they said would fuel the perception that the Army was trying to protect its senior leaders at the expense of junior officers and enlisted soldiers.

File this under "If It Looks Like A Duck."

Anthony D. Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, denounced the findings and urged the Bush administration to appoint a special independent counsel to look up the military and Pentagon civilian chains of command. "This further underscores the military's inability to look into allegations of torture and abuse," Mr. Romero said in a telephone interview. "It's just another effort to paper over the scandal."

File this under "And If It Walks Like A Duck."

Guy Womack, a lawyer for the Army reservist who the government had called the ringleader in the abuse, Specialist Charles A. Graner Jr., said he had interviewed Generals Sanchez and Wojdakowski and agreed with the Army's findings about them. But he said General Fast and Colonel Warren were more directly involved in overseeing detention policy and operations and should have been disciplined. "It's a joke," he said.

File this under "And If It Quacks Like A Duck."

Democratic aides, who along with their Republican counterparts were briefed this week on the Army inquiry's findings, said Friday that they disagreed with the conclusions and would review the full investigation before determining their next step.

Army officials defended the investigation as an exhaustive inquiry that included a review of the 10 major inquiries so far, sworn statements from 37 senior officials, including L. Paul Bremer III, the former top civilian administrator in Iraq, as well as information gathered from dozens of criminal investigations and courts-martial.

"The recommendations and decisions are consistent with, and appropriate to, the findings of these very thorough investigations," Brig. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, the Army's top spokesman, said in a statement.

Based on Schlesinger's "independent panel" and the Kern-Fay-Jones report cited above, this statement isn't congruent with, for instance, the precise truth.

Senator John W. Warner, the Virginia Republican who heads the Armed Services Committee, declined in a statement to comment directly on the Army's findings, but signaled he would call a hearing on senior officer accountability in the detainee abuse scandal. A spokesman for Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee's ranking Democrat, declined to comment.

I'm often proud of the senior senator from Virginia. After all, he got married, last time, in a kilt (http://www.washingtonian.com/capital_comment/2004/feb04capcom.html).

As a result of the findings of the Schlesinger panel and other military inquiries, Mr. Warner's committee directed the Army in September to review the cases of General Sanchez and at least four other senior officers in Iraq to determine if any should be held accountable and disciplined.

The Army expanded that inquiry to 12 officers of the rank of colonel or higher, including anyone of that rank who was criticized in at least one of the 10 major investigations.

Four senior Defense Department officials, who provided details about the inquiry on the condition of anonymity because several members of Congress had not been fully briefed, declined to identify the officers under scrutiny, although the five whom Congress has focused on were well known. Nor did they say whether any of seven other officers under scrutiny were disciplined. Congressional aides said they had not yet been briefed on those cases.

The 12 officers under scrutiny by the inspector general do not include the top two military intelligence officers at Abu Ghraib, Col. Thomas M. Pappas and Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan. Senior military officials said they were being examined by separate investigations that could lead to criminal charges.

And that speaks volumes in itself.

General Green, the inspector general, has completed his review of allegations against 11 of the 12 officers, officials said. If the allegations were not substantiated, no action was taken. If they were, the files were forwarded to the Army judge advocate general, the senior military lawyer, Maj. Gen. Thomas Romig, who could recommend a wide range of disciplinary options, from no action to counseling to a career-killing reprimand. The 12 officers had the right to respond to the findings before any disciplinary action were taken.

A senior military official said there were no criminal allegations against any of the 12 officers.
General Sanchez, once considered for promotion to be the four-star commander of military operations in Latin America, remains the head of the Army's V Corps, based in Germany. It is unclear whether he will be given a new assignment when his command ends this summer or whether he will retire.

Glossary

The following glossary is provided to assist with decrypting my postings:

NOTE: This glossary is a continuous work in progress. My apologies for any incomplete entries.

For interesting and very extensive military-related dictionaries, see also:

1. "An Unofficial Dictionary for Marines" (http://4mermarine.com/USMC/dictionary.html).
2. "An Air Force glossary from 'Kofana' " (http://web.deu.edu.tr/atiksu/f16/glos.html)

A. - (German) Abteilung.
A.A. - 1. anti-aircraft. 2. Associate of Arts. 3. (German) Aufklärungs-Abteilung.
A.A.A. - anti-aircraft artillery.
A.A.C.T.E. - American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education.
AAFES - Army & Air Force Exchange System.
AAM - Army Achievement Medal.
A.A.S. - Associate in Applied Science.
AB - Air Base.
ABC - Atomic, Biological or Chemical. See also: CBR, NBC.
Abteilung - (German) Department, unit, battery, or battalion.
AC - Active Component.
A.C.A. - Associate of the Institute of Chartered Accountants.
A.C.C.A. - Associate of Certified & Corporate Accountants.
ACR - Armored Cavalry Regiment.
ACS - American Citizen Services.
ACSI - (Obsolete) Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the U.S. Army. See DCSI.
Active Component - The part of the U.S. Army formerly known as the Regular Army.
ACU - Army Combat Uniform.
ADM - 1. Admiral, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard). 2. Atomic Demolitions & Munitions.
AF - 1. Africa. 2. Bureau of African Affairs.
AFB - Air Force Base.
AG - 1. Adjutant General. 2. Attorney General.
AGCM - Army Good Conduct Medal.
AID - (Obsolete) U.S. Agency for International Development. See: USAID.
AK-47 - Assault Rifle Kalashnikov, model of 1947.
Ali Baba - (Slang) Bandit, terrorist or other badguy.
alien - __.
Ambo - (Slang) Ambassador.
Amcit - (Slang) American citizen.
AMEMB - American Embassy.
ammunition - A Class V supply category including chemical, biological, radiological, and special weapons.
ANG - Army National Guard.
APFT - Army Physical Fitness Test.
APRT - Army Physical Readiness Test.
AR - Army Regulation.
ARCOTR - Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon.
ARTEP - Army Training and Evaluation Program.
ASR - Army Service Ribbon.
AT - Army Times. A newspaper.
Aufklärungs-Abteilung - (German) Reconnaissance unit.
AWOL - Absent Without Official Leave.
A-1 - Visa issued to diplomatic officers.
A-2 - Visa issued to clerical staff of embassies and consulates.
A-3 - Visa issued to servants of diplomats.
A-100 - (Slang) Orientation course for new FSOs.

Badr Brigade - Military forces of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir Al Hakim (http://www.sciri.btinternet.co.uk/English/About_Us/Badr/badr.html).
Badr Corps - SCIRI's military forces. See: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/badr.htm.
Bart. - Baronet.
BCIS - Bureau of Citizen and Immigration Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
BDU - Battle Dress Uniform.
BG - 1. Boston Globe. A newspaper. 2. Brigadier General, U.S. Army.
B GEN - Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps.
BIAP - Baghdad International Airport.
Blackwater - An American security firm providing services in Iraq.
Br. - Brother.
BRIG GEN - Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force.
BSM - Bronze Star Medal.
BTW - "By The Way."
BX - Base Exchange.
B&N - Barnes and Noble. A bookseller.

CA - 1. Civil Affairs. 2. Consular Affairs.
CAPT - 1. Captain, U.S. Marine Corps. 2. Captain, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
Capt. - Captain.
C.B. - Companion of the Order of the Bath.
C.B.E. - Companion of the Order of the British Empire.
CBR - Chemical, Biological or Radiological. See also: ABC, NBC.
c.c. - 1. carbon copy. 2. courtesy copy.
CD - 1. Certificate of Deposit. 2. Compact Disk.
CDO - Career Development Officer.
CDR - Commander, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
CE - (Obsolete) Corps of Engineers; see EN.
CENTO - Central Treaty Organization.
CG - Consul General.
CHAMS - CI/HUMINT Automation Management System.
CHATS - Counterintelligence/Humint Automated Tool Set.
Chief - (Slang) Form of address for a chief warrant officer.
CI - Counterintelligence.
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency.
C.I.E. - Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire.
CIIR - Counterintelligence Information Report.
CINC - Commander-in-Chief.
CINCPAC - Commander in Chief, Pacific.
Class I - Basic category or "class" of supply for subsistance, including health and welfare items.
Class II - Basic category or "class" of supply for individual equipment.
Class III - Basic category or "class" of supply for POL.
Class IV - Basic category or "class" of supply for construction materials.
Class V - Basic category or "class" of supply for ammunition.
Class VI - Basic category or "class" of supply for personal demand items.
Class VII - Basic category or "class" of supply for major end items.
Class VIII - Basic category or "class" of supply for medical supplies.
Class IX - Basic category or "class" of supply for repair parts.
Class X - Basic category of "class" of supply for non-military programs.
CM - Career-Minister.
C.M.G. - Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.
CO - 1. Commanding Officer. 2. Conscientious Objector.
COHORT - Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training System.
COINTELPRO - ____.
COL - Colonel, U.S. Army (or Air Force or Marine Corps).
Col. - (Obsolete) Colonel.
COM - Chief of Mission.
company grade officer - U.S. Army, Air Force or Marine Corps officer in the rank of either second lieutenant, first lieutenant, or captain.
CONGEN - 1. Consulate General. 2. Initial course of instruction for consular officers.
construction materials - A Class IV supply category.
CONUS - Continental U.S.
Corp. - (Obsolete) Corporal, U.S. Army.
CoS - 1. Chief of Staff. 2. Chief of State.
CPL - Corporal, U.S. Army.
CPT - Captain.
CQ - Charge of Quarters.
crew-served weapon - ____.
CSA - 1. Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. 2. Central Security Agency. 3. Confederate States of America.
C.S.I. - Companion of the Order of the Star of India.
CSM - Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army.
CTB - Career Tenuring Board.
C.V.O. - Companion of the Royal Victorian Order.
C.W.O. - Chief Warrant Officer.
CWOP - Cancelled Without Prejudice.
CW2 - Chief Warrant Officer 2 or W-2.
CW3 - Chief Warrant Officer 3 or W-3.
CW4 - Chief Warrant Officer 4 or W-4.
CY - Calendar Year.

DA - Department of the Army, U.S. Department of Defense.
DAR - Daughters of the American Revolution.
DAS - Deputy Assistant Secretary.
DATT - Defense Attaché
D.C. - District of Columbia.
DCI - Director of Central Intelligence.
DCSI - Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the U.S. Army. Formerly and occasionally still known as "the ACSI."
DCU - Desert Camouflage Uniform.
DD - Defense Daily. A newspaper.
D.D.S. - Doctor of Dental Surgery.
DepSec - Deputy Secretary.
Derivative Status - __.
DEROS - Date Expected Return O___ S__
DF - (Obsolete) Disposition Form, DA Form 2496.
DHS - U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. Department of Defense.
DIIR - Draft Intelligence Information Report.
Dil - (Slang) Delinquency Report.
DMZ - De-Militarized Zone.
DNI - Director of National Intelligence.
DOC - U.S. Department of Commerce.
DoD - U.S. Department of Defense.
DOE - U.S. Department of Energy.
DOL - U.S. Department of Labor.
DOS - U.S. Department of State.
DOT - U.S. Department of Transportation.
DR - Duty Roster.
DRI - Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.
DS - 1. Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State. 2. Diplomatic Security.
DSS - Diplomatic Security Service.
D.S.O. - Companion of the Distinguished Service Order.
DV - Diversity Visa.
DVD - Digital Video Disk.
D.V.M. - Doctor of Veterinary Medicine.
DZ - Drop Zone.

EAC - Echelon Above Corps.
EAP - 1. Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs. 2. East Asia Pacific region.
ECB - Echelon, Corps and Below.
EER - (Obsolete) Enlisted Evaluation Report. See instead: NCOER.
e.g. - (Latin) exempli gratia.
ELO - Entry Level (FS) Officer. See also: JO.
EN - Corps of Engineers.
ENS - Ensign, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
Entry Level Officer - U.S. Foreign Service generalist in the grade of either FS/FP-06, FS/FP-05, or FS/FP-04. Formerly "JO."
EO - Executive Order.
EPW - Enemy Prisoner of War.
esq. - Esquire.
est. - Established.
ETS - Expiration Term of Service .
EU - European Union.
EUR - 1. Bureau of European Affairs. 2. Europe.
exempli gratia - (Latin) "for the sake of example;" "for example."
E-1 - (Paygrade) 1. Private (PVT or Pvt.), U.S. Army (or Marine Corps). 2. Seaman Recruit, U.S. Navy. 3. Airman Basic, U.S. Air Force.
E-2 - (Paygrade) 1. Private (Pvt. or PV2), U.S. Army. 2. Private First Class, U.S. Marine Corps. 3. Seaman Apprentice, U.S. Navy. 4. Airman, U.S. Air Force.
E-3 - (Paygrade) 1. Lance Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps. 2. Private First Class (PFC or Pfc.), U.S. Army. 3. Seaman, U.S. Navy. 4. Airman First Class, U.S. Air Force.
E-4 - (Paygrade) 1. Corporal (Corp. or CPL) or Specialist (SPC or Spec.), U.S. Army. 2. Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps. 3. Petty Officer Third Class, U.S. Navy. 4. Sergeant or Senior Airman, U.S. Air Force.
E-5 - (Paygrade) 1. Petty Officer Second Class, U.S. Navy. 2. Sergeant (SGT or Sgt.), U.S. Army (or Marine Corps). 3. Staff Sergeant, U.S. Air Force.
E-6 - (Paygrade) 1. Petty Officer First Class, U.S. Navy. 2. Staff Sergeant (SSG or S.Sgt.), U.S. Army (or Marine Corps). 3. Technical Sergeant, U.S. Air Force.
E-7 - (Paygrade) 1. Chief Petty Officer, U.S. Navy. 2. Gunnery Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps. 3. Sergeant First Class (SFC), U.S. Army. 4. Master Sergeant, U.S. Air Force
E-8 - (Paygrade) 1. First Sergeant (1SG) or Master Sergeant (MSG), U.S. Army (or Marine Corps). 2. Senior Chief Petty Officer, U.S. Navy. 3. Senior Master Sergeant, U.S. Air Force.
E-9 - (Paygrade) 1. Master Chief Petty Officer or Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, U.S. Navy. 2. Sergeant Major (SM) or Command Sergeant Major (CSM) or Sergeant Major of the Army, U.S. Army. 3. Sergeant Major or Master Gunnery Sergeant or Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Corps. 4. Chief Master Sergeant of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, U.S. Air Force.

FADM - Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy.
FAH - Foreign Affairs Handbook.
FAM - Foreign Affairs Manual.
FAO - Foreign Area Officer.
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.
FCS - Foreign Commercial Service, U.S. Department of Commerce.
FHS - Fellow of the Heraldry Society (London).
field grade officer - U.S. Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps officer in the rank of either major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel.
FY - Fiscal Year.
Five - (Radio Slang) executive officer.
flag officer - U.S. Navy or Coast Guard officer in the rank of either rear admiral (upper and lower half), vice admiral, or admiral.
FLOTUS - First Lady of the U.S.
FM - Foreign Minister.
FMO - Facilities Maintenance Officer.
FNG - Pocking New Guy.
following to join - __.
FONMIN - Foreign Minister.
Four - 1. (Slang) G-4. 2. (Slang) S-4. 3. (Radio Slang) The S-1 (or G-1).
FP - Foreign Service Probationary.
FPRI - Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Fr. - 1. Father. 2. Frau.
Frau - (German) 1. woman. 2. Mrs.
Fraulein - (German) Miss.
Frl. - (German) Fraulein.
FS - Foreign Service.
FSA - Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries (London).
FSA Scot - Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland.
FSN - Foreign Service National.
FSO - Foreign Service Officer
FSS - Foreign Service Specialist.
FS-04 - (Paygrade) Highest, of three, entry level officer ranks, U.S. Foreign Service.
FS-05 - (Paygrade) Middle, of three, entry level officer ranks, U.S. Foreign Service.
FS-06 - __
FS-156 - (Form) Nonimmigrant Visa Application.
FS-157 - (Form) Supplemental Nonimmigrant Visa Application.

G - Visa issued to members of international organizations.
G.B.E. - Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire.
G.C.B. - Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath.
G.C.I.E. - Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire.
G.C.M.G. - Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.
G.C.S.I. - Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Star of India.
G.C.V.O. - Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order.
GEN - General, U.S. Army (or Air Force or Marine Corps).
Gen. - (Obsolete) General.
general officer - U.S. Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps officer in the rank of either brigadier general, major general, lieutenant general, or general.
Gewehr 3 - (German) ___.
good travel - Evidence that a NIV applicant has a reliable history of complying with travel and visa regulations, restrictions, and limitations. "Good travel" is often considered a positive indicator in the adjudication of NIV applications.
GSA - General Service Administration.
GSO - General Services Officer.
GWI - Gulf War I.
GWII - Gulf War II.
GWOT - Global War On Terror(ism).
GWOT-EM - Global War On Terrorism Expeditionary Medal.
GWOT-SM - Global War On Terrorism Service Medal.
GW1 - Gulf War I.
GW2 - Gulf War II.
G-1 - Principal functional section of a general staff dealing with personnel.
G-2 - Principal functional section of general staff dealing with military inteliigence.
G-3 - 1. "Gewehr 3." 2. Principal functional section of a general staff dealing with operations and training.
G-4 - Principal functional section of a general staff dealing with logistics.
G-5 - Principal functional section of a general staff dealing with civil affairs/military government.

Haj - (Arabic) The obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca made by believers in the Moslem faith.
Hajji - (2. (Arabic) Honorific indicating the bearer has completed the Haj or obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca. 2. (Slang) An Iraqi civilian.
Hajjis - (Slang) Iraqi civilians.
HE - 1. High Explosive(s). 2. His (or Her) Excellency.
HEW - (Obsolete) U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
HG - Host Government.
H.H. - 1. Her Highness. 2. His Highness.
HHS - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
H.I.M. - 1. Her Imperial Majesty. 2. His Imperial Majesty.
H.M. - 1. Her Majesty. 2. His Majesty.
HoG - Head of Government.
homeless - __.
H.R.H. - 1. Her Royal Highness. 2. His Royal Highness.
H.S.H. - 1. Her Serene Highness. 2. His Serene Highness.
HVT - High Value Target.
H1-B - Non-immigrant visa classification.

IC - Intelligence Community.
id est - (Latin) "that is (to say)."
i.e. - (Latin) id est.
IED - Improvised Explosive Device.
IIR - Intelligence Information Report.
IIRC - "If I Recall Correctly."
IMF - International Monetary Fund.
individual equipment - A Class II supply category including clothing, tentage, organization tool sets and tool kits, hand tools, administrative and housekeeping supplies, and equipment. Subclassifications include weapons, power generators, textiles, and so forth.
INA - Immigration and Naturalization Act.
intending immigrant - ____.
INS - (Obsolete) Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice.
IPB - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
IR - Intelligence Report.
IRR - Individual Ready Reserve.
IRS - Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury.
ISG - Iraq Security Group.
I.S.O. - Companion of the Imperial Service Order.
IV - Immigrant Visa.

JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff.
j.g. - junior grade.
JO - (Obsolete) Junior (FS) Officer
JUMPS - Joint Uniform Military Pay System.
junior officer - 1. U.S. Navy or Coast Guard officer in the rank of either ensign, lieutenent junior grade (j.g.), lieutenant, or lieutenant commander. Equivalent to U.S. Army, Air Force, or Marine company grade officer plus the rank of major. 2. (Obsolete) U.S. Foreign Service generalist in the grade of either FS-06, FS-05, or FS-04. See instead: ELO.

K.B.E. - Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire.
KBR - Kellogg Brown & Root. A government services contractor.
K.C.B. - Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath.
KCC - Kentucky __ Center.
K.C.I.E. - Knight Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire.
K.C.M.G. - Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.
K.C.S.I. - Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India.
K.C.V.O. - Knight Commander of the Royal Victorian Order.
KISS - "Keep It Simple, Stupid."
K.G. - Knight Companion of the Order of the Garter.
KKK - Ku Klux Klan.
K.P. - Knight Companion of the Order of St. Patrick.
K.T. - Knight of the Order of the Thistle.

Landline - Telephone, exclusive of cellular or portable phones.
LAT - Los Angeles Times. A newspaper.
LAW - Light Anti-tank Weapon.
LCDR - Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
L.D.S. - The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
LEGATT - Legal Attaché.
LG - Lieutenant General.
LJ - LiveJournal.
LM - Legion of Merit.
LOD - Line of Duty.
LPR - Legal Permanent Resident.
LSA - Logistics Support Area.
LT - Lieutenant, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
Lt. - (Obsolete) Lieutenant.
LT COL - Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force (or Marine Corps).
Lt.Col. - (Obsolete) Lieutenant Colonel.
LTC - Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army.
LTG - (Obsolete) Lieutenant General, U.S. Army.
LT GEN - Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force (or Marine Corps).
Lt.Gen. - (Obsolete) Lieutenant General.
LTJG - Lieutenant, junior grade, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
LZ - Landing Zone.

MADM - Medium Atomic Demolition Munition.
Mahdi Army - Mookie's private militia.
maintain status - __.
MAJ - Major, U.S. Army (or Air Force or Marine Corps).
Maj. - Major.
MAJ GEN - Major General, U.S. Air Force (or Marine Corps).
Maj. Gen. - Major General.
major end items - A Class VII supply category including final combinations of end products ready for intended use. Subclassifications include bridging and fire-fighting equipment, administrative and tactical vehicles, missiles, weapons, and special weapons.
MBA - Master of Business Administration.
M.B.E. - Member of the Order of the British Empire.
MC - Minister-Counselor.
MCM - Manual for Courts-Martial.
M.D. - Doctor of Medicine.
MDW - Military District of Washington.
MEDEVAC - Medical Evacuation.
medical materials or supplies - A Class VIII supply category.
MEGO - "My Eyes Glaze Over."
MEK - Mujahedin-e Khalq. See also: NCRI; PMOI.
MEP - Member of the European Parliament.
MG - 1. Machine Gun. 2. Major General, U.S. Army.
MFA - 1. Minister of Foreign Affairs. 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
MH - Miami Herald. A newspaper.
MI - Military Intelligence.
Mid-Grade Officer - U.S. Foreign Service Officer in the grade of either FS-03, FS-02, or FS-01.
Middle-Grade Officer - See "Mid-Grade Officer."
Mookie - (Slang) Moqtada al-Sadr.
MP - 1. Member of Parliament. 2. Military Police.
MPD - Metropolitan Police Department (of the District of Columbia).
MPRI - Military Professional Resources Inc. of Alexandria, Va..
MRB - Multiple Role Bridge.
MRV - Machine Readable Visa.
MSG - Master Sergeant, U.S. Army.
MSM - Mainstream Media.
MS-13 - (Spanish) Malva Salvatrucha.
Muj - (Slang) Mujaheddin: guerilla fighter or terrorist.
MUTA - Multiple Unit Training Assembly.
M.V.O. - 1. Member (4th Class) of the Royal Victorian Order. 2. Member (5th Class) of the Royal Victorian Order.
M-16 - American military rifle firing a 5.56 mm round.
M-60 - American military machine gun firing a standard 7.76 mm round.
M-203 - American grenade launcher which is used attached to the M-16 and fires a 40 mm round.

NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement.
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
n.b. - (Latin) nota bene.
N.C.O. - Non-Commissioned Officer.
NCODP - Non-Commissioned Officer Development Program.
NCOPDR - Non-Commissioned Officer Profesional Development Ribbon.
NCOER - Non-Commissioned Officer Evaluation Report. See also: EER.
NCRI - National Council of Resistance of Iran.
NDSM - National Defense Service Medal.
NEA - 1. Bureau of Near East Asian Affairs. 2. Near East Asian region.
NG - National Guard.
NIV - Non-immigrant Visa.
N.J. - New Jersey.
NMS - New Manning System.
non-diversity country - __.
non-military programs - A Class X supply category including material to support non-military programs, such as agricultural and economic development.
nota bene - (Latin) "note well."
Nouvel An - (French) Happy New Year.
NTC - National Training Center.
NVC - National Visa Center.
NYDN - New York Daily News. A newspaper.
NYP - New York Post. A newspaper.
NYT - New York Times. A newspaper.

OAS - Organization of American States.
O.B.E. - Officer of the Order of the British Empire.
OC - Officer-Counselor.
OCONUS - Outside the Continental U.S.
OCR - Optical Character Recognition.
OCS - Officer Candidate School.
OIF - Operation Iraqi Freedom.
OIF1 - Operation Iraqi Freedom, first rotation.
OJE - Operation Joint Endeavor.
OJG - Operation Joint Guard.
O.M. - Member of the Order of Merit.
OMB - Office of Management & Budget.
One - 1. (Slang) S-1. 2. (Slang) G-1. 3. (Radio Slang) The S-4 (or G-4)
OP - Observation Post.
OSD - Office of the (U.S.) Secretary of Defense.
OSR - Overseas Service Ribbon.
OTS - Officer Training School.
overstay - __.
out of status - __.
O-1 - (Paygrade) 1. Ensign, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard). 2. Second Lieutenant (2LT), U.S. Army. 3. Second Lieutenant (2nd LT), U.S. Air Force (or Marine Corps).
O-2 - (Paygrade) 1. First Lieutenant (1LT), U.S. Army. 2. First Lieutenant (1st LT), U.S. Air Force (or Marine Corps). 3. Lieutenant, junior grade, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
O-3 - (Paygrade) 1. Captain (Capt. or CPT). 2. Captain (CAPT), U.S. Air Force (or Marine Corps). 3. Lieutenant (LT), U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
O-4 - (Paygrade) 1. Lieutenant Commander (LCDR), U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard). 2. Major (MAJ or Maj.), U.S. Army (or Air Force or Marine Corps)
O-5 - (Paygrade) 1. Commander (CDR), U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard). 2. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC or Lt.Col.). 3. Lieutenant Colonel (LT COL), U.S. Air Force (or Marine Corps).
O-6 - (Paygrade) 1. Captain (CAPT), U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard). 2. Colonel (COL or Col.), U.S. Army (or Air Force or Marine Corps).
O-7 - (Paygrade) General Officers and Admirals.

PBS - Public Broadcasting System.
PC - 1. Peace Corps. 2. "politically correct."
p.c. - (French) pour condoler.
Persona(e) non Grata(e) - (Latin) "one who is not acceptable."
personal demand items - A Class VI supply category including beer and liquer.
p.f. - (French) pour féliciter.
PFC - Private First Class, U.S. Army.
Pfc. - (Obsolete) Private First Class.
p.f.n.a. - (French) Nouvel An.
Ph.D. - Doctor of Philosophy.
PI - Philadelphia Inquirer. A newspaper.
P.L. - Public Law.
PM - Prime Minister.
p.m. - (French) pour memoire.
PMOI - People's Mojdahedin Organization of Iran. See MEK; NCRI.
PNG - (Latin) Persona(e) non Grata(e).
POL - 1. A Class III supply category. 2. Petroleum, Oils , Lubricants.
por ejemplo - (Spanish) "for example."
POTUS - President of the U.S.
pour condoler - (French) "to condole."
pour féliciter - (French) "to congratulate."
pour memoire - (French) "to remind."
pour prendre congé - (French) "to take leave."
pour présenter - (French) "to present."
pour remercier - (French) "to thank."
POW - Prisoner of War.
p.p. - (French) pour présenter.
p.p.c. - (French) pour prendre congé.
p.r. - (French) pour remercier.
PRC - 1. Permanent Resident Card. 2. People's Republic of China.
previous economic migrant - ____.
Prof. - Professor.
PT - Physical Training.
PUC - Presidential Unit Citation.
PVT - Private, U.S. Army (Paygrade E-1).
Pvt. - (Obsolete) Private, U.S. Army.
PV2 - Private, U.S. Army (Paygrade E-2).
PX - Post Exchange.

QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review.

RADM - Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
RADML - Rear Admiral Lower (half), U.S. Navy.
Realpolitik - (German) ____.
REMF - Rear Echelon Motherpocker.
Rep. - Representative.
repair parts - A Class IX supply category including components and repair parts.
Ret. - Retired.
Rev. - Reverend.
RC - Reserve Component.
R.N. - 1. Registered Nurse. 2. Royal Navy.
ROTC - Reserve Officer Training Corps.
RPG - 1. Rifle-Propelled Grenade. 2. Role Playing Game.
RSVP - _____.
RVN - Republic of (South) Vietnam.
R&R - Rest and Relaxation.

SA - 1. Bureau of South Asian Affairs. 2. South Asian region. 3. State Annex.
SADM - Special Atomic Demolition Munition.
SAO - Survivor Assistance Officer.
Sarge - (Slang) Form of address for a sergeant.
SAW - Squad Automatic Weapon, the M249 Light Machine Gun.
SCIRI - Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SDI - Strategic Defense Initiative.
SEATO - South East Asia Treaty Organization.
Sec. - Secretary.
SecDef - U.S. Secretary of Defense; currently the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld.
SecState - U.S. Secretary of State; currently the Honorable Condoleeza Rice.
Sen. - Senator.
senior officer - U.S. Navy or Coast Guard officer in the rank of either commander or captain.
Señor - (Spanish) ____.
SEO - Security Engineering Officer.
Seven - (Radio Slang) company first sergeant or battalion or higher unit sergeant major.
SF - Special Forces.
SFC - Sergeant First Class, U.S. Army.
SFS - Senior Foreign Service.
SFTT - Soldiers For The Truth.
SGLI - Servicemen's Group Life Insurance.
SGT - Sergeant, U.S. Army.
Sgt. - (Obsolete) Sergeant, U.S. Army.
Six - 1. (Radio Shorthand) unit commander. 2. (Slang) rear.
S.J. - Society of Jesus.
SM - Sergeant Major.
SMA - Sergeant Major of the Army, U.S. Army.
Smadge - (Slang) sergeant major.
Smaj - (Slang) See "Smadge."
SNAFU - (Slang) "Situation Normal, All Fouled Up."
Spec4 - (Obsolete) Specialist (paygrade E-4), U.S. Army.
Sr. - 1. (Spanish) Señor. 2. Sister.
SSG - Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army.
S.Sgt. - (Obsolete) Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army.
St. - 1. Saint. 2. Street.
Ste. - 1. (French) Sainte. 2. Suite.
subsistence - A Class I supply category including health and welfare items. Subclassifications include inflight rations, refrigerated subsistence, nonrefrigerated subsistence, and combat rations.
SUSFU - (Slang) "Situation Unchanged, Still Fouled Up."
SUV - Sport Utility Vehicle.
S-1
S-2
S-3
S-4
S-5

TAA - Tactical Assembly Area.
TCN - Third Country National.
Three - 1. (Slang) G-3. 2. (Slang) S-3. 3. (Radio Shorthand) The S-2 (or G-2).
TL - Transmittal Letter.
TR - Transportation Request.
Two - 1. (Slang) G-2. 2. (Slang) S-2. 3. (Radio Shorthand) The S-4 (or G-4).
TY - Training Year.

UCMJ - Uniform Code of Military Justice.
U.K. - United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
UN - United Nations.
U.S. - United States of America.
U/S - Under Secretary.
USA - 1. U.S. Army, est. 1775. 2. United States of America, est. 1776.
USAF - United States Air Force.
USAFA - U.S. Air Force Academy.
USAR - U.S. Army Reserve.
USA-T - USA Today. A newspaper.
U.S.C. - U.S. Code.
USCG - U.S. Coast Guard.
USCGA - U.S. Coast Guard Academy.
USCGR - U.S. Coast Guard Reserve.
USDA - U.S. Department of Agriculture.
USG - U.S. Government.
USIA - (Obsolete) U.S. Information Agency.
USIS - (Obsolete) U.S. Information Service.
USMA - U.S. Military Academy.
USMC - U.S. Marine Corps.
USMCR - U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.
USN - U.S. Navy.
USNA - U.S. Naval Academy.
USNR - U.S. Naval Reserve.
USN&WR - U.S. News and World Report. A newspaper.
USPS - U.S. Postal Service.
USSS - U.S. Secret Service.
UTA - Unit Training Assembly.

VADM - Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (or Coast Guard).
VC - Viet Cong.
VGLI - Veteran's Group Life Insurance.
VIP - Very Important Person.
V.P. - Vice President.
VWP - Visa Waiver Program.

WETSU - (Slang) "We Eat This Stuff Up.`"
WHA - Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
WHO - World Health Organization (of the United Nations).
WO1 - Warrant Officer 1 or W-1.
WP - The Washington Post. A newspaper.
WSJ - Wall Street Journal. A newspaper.
WT - The Washington Times. A newspaper.
W-1 - (Paygrade) Warrant Officer 1.
W-2 - (Paygrade) Chief Warrant Officer 2.
W-3 - (Paygrade) Chief Warrant Officer 3.
W-4 - (Paygrade) Chief Warrant Officer 4.
W-5 - (Paygrade) Master Chief Warrant Officer 5.

X - Mr. X; Pen name of George Kennan.

YMCA - Young Men's Christian Association.
YWCA - Young Women's Christian Association.

1 - See "One."
1LT - First Lieutenant, U.S. Army.
1SG - First Sergeant, U.S. Army.
1st LT - First Lieutenant, U.S. Air Force (or Marine Corps).
2 - See "Two."
2LT - Second Lieutenant, U.S. Army.
2nd LT - Second Lieutenant, U.S. Air Force (or Marine Corps).
3 - See "Three."
4 - See "Four."
5 - See "Five."
6 - See "Six."
7 - See "Seven."
214(b) - (INA section) "intending immigrant."
221(g) - (INA section) "__"


Bibliography:

"Protocol: The Complete Handbook of Diplomatic, Official and Social Usage," Mary Jane McCaffree, Pauline Innis, Richard M. Sand, Esq., 25th Anniversary Edition, Durban House.
"Service Etiquette," Oretha D. Swartz, Fourth Edition, Naval Institute Press.
"The NCO Guide," SGM Dan Cragg, SGM Dennis D. Perez, 3rd Edition, Stackpole Books.
"Larousse Mini Dictionary: Spanish-English, English-Spanish," Larousse-Bordas 1999.
"Collins Gem dictionary: German-English English-German Dictionary,"Collins, London and Glasgow, 1982.
"German Order of Battle 1944: The Directory, Prepared by Allied Intelligence, of Regiments, Formations and Units of the German Armed Forces," introduction by I.V. Hogg, Greenhill Books.
"The Jamaica Directory of Personalities, 2001-2002," Selectco Publications Ltd.
"Langenscheidt Standard Dictionary German: German-English, English-German," Langenscheidt Publishers, Inc.
"Immigration and Naturalization Act," 8 U.S.C. 1001, as amended.

The End.